A series of interesting stories were featured in GSN today. It is a pretty good oveview of strategic security news, though US focused. 

First of all, it looks like Indian PM Singh has finally got the support he needs for the 123 agreement with the US. This is pretty important, as there was a distinct possibility that the deal would expire with the end of the Bush term. The socialists have finally come around to the deal, which was highly favourable to India anyway. Now we wait to see how Australia will act in the NSG and afterwards.

It also looks like the Czech republic is about to sing the deal with the US on deploying the missile defence radar on their territory. Apparently there is also a possibility that Poland will sign off on the deal to host the missile interceptors. This sort of thing is obviously going to piss off Russia, as it is directed at their missile arsenal. The fact it is in former Warsaw Pact states only makes it worse, it is just a continuation of the US offensives of the 90s, as they moved in on Russia's former territory. The accompanying expansion of NATO was a similar thing. This percieved domination of Russia is still a sore spot, and aspects of Putin's presidency can almost be seen as a reaction to this period.

The report also highlights the fact that Russia and the US agree on points such as Iran and North Korea's nuclear programs. The established nuclear powers dont want any others to join the game. Thats what drove the creation of the NPT, and what is driving some in their push for nuclear disarmament. The focus on non-proliferation is obviously driven by this, but the push for disarmament also to some extent wishes to cement the current strategic status. The US would still be the most powerful military in the world without nukes, and they would also have one less threat, and strategic equaliser, to worry about.

Rudd's proposal for an International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament is fantastic news. It looks like we finally have a PM who is going to put non-proliferation and disarmament at the top of the national agenda, and actively work for it in the international arena. I know nuclear weapons NGOs are working hard to influence the construction of this new body, and what exactly will be its main focus. Rudds announcement came after he visited the Hiroshima memorial, the first Australian PM to do so. You can get the text of the Kyoto Uni speech here, but I'm going to pick out a few interesting key parts. 

The speech pushed all the wanky Japan-Australia friendship stuff, and also reiterated and clarified Rudd's proposal for the Asia Pacific community (does he have any more of these things up his sleeve?). There was also a strong focus on climate change. The interesting part was his explanation for this nuclear commission. 

I definitely like his first point.

"In the past decade, the world has not paid adequate attention to nuclear weapons."

He also states that...

"...we must be committed to the ultimate objective of a nuclear weapons free world"

So this is all a good sign. Unfortunately it is slightly tarred by his references to Iran and North Korea, as if they are the only states that are driving nuclear proliferation. Rudd consistently uses the term non-proliferation ahead of disarmament, and this is a conscious choice. It seems to be a non-proliferation commission first, and a disarmament commission second. Yet these are mutually reinforcing things that can only succeed when they both work together. By focussing on non-proliferation over disarmament, Rudd is ignoring the issue of the NWS arsenals that are one major aspect driving this proliferation. 

Rudds renewed emphasis on the NPT is a good thing, he notes that... 

"There are two courses of action available to the community of nations: to allow the NPT to continue to fragment; or to exert every global effort to restore and defend the treaty."

This is very true, and the recalcitrence of states in fullfilling their NPT obligations (both NWS and NNWS) is a major force weakening the treaty. Rudd also emphasises the importance of the 2010 review conference. Will it be able to achieve anything were the last couple have failed? 

Rudd also outlines some possible courses of recommendation that this commission might adopt, looking at the recommendations made by Schultz/Kissinger/Perry/Nunn, that we should

"-Strengthen the means of monitoring compliance with the NPT – which could be achieved through requiring all NPT signatories to adopt monitoring provisions designed by the IAEA; 

-Develop an international system to manage the nuclear fuel cycle – given the growing interest in nuclear energy; and 

-Adopt a process to bring the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty into force. "

All seemingly good recommendations. The CTBT and IAEA monitoring are very important and possibly achieveable measures, eventually. But international control of the nuclear fuel cycle is a very interesting question. Will NWS and other nuclear states give up their control of the fuel cycle to prevent others obtaining the same technologies? Or will the proposal be more along the lines of international control for some, and state control for the established nuclear powers. That is the sort of proposal floating around now in relation to Iran's nuclear program. But this would create a two-tiered international system, with developed rich states maintaining control over the energy supplies of poorer ones. This question also applies to the idea of increased IAEA monitoring, would the established NWS have to undergo as extensive monitoring as states such as Iran would? It comes down again to who is percieved as a 'good state'.

And again, this group of recommendations mainly still focus on non-proliferation rather than disarmament. 

Lets hope this renewed focus on nuclear weapons will successfully evolve into a wider reaching one than it looks like now, because in order to effectively curb proliferation and the state desire for nukes, we need to reduce their presence in the international system aswell. The growing evidence of the 'second nuclear age' and the nuclear energy renaissance mean that the danger of nuclear weapons is increasing and there is a critical need to combat that threat. 

In related news, the press conference after Rudd's speech revealed that he is apparently standing by the Labor policy of no nuclear exports to non-NPT members. This means that India will not be getting Australian uranium, yet it doesnt necessarily change Australia's position at the NSG. I imaging we will still be in the position of giving others the green light to export, while we hold back. A good sign nonetheless. 

So much for that promised Saturday post. I will hopefully blog soon on the latest IAEA report on Iran and also on the relatively successful cluster munitions convention. For now its Australa and non-proliferation. 

An interesting article appeared in The Age a couple of days ago in which it was revealed that Rudd will probably renew and follow one of Howard's policies, again. Before the election, Labor promised that no Australian uranium would go to India, even if the US 123 agreement came through. Stephen Smith had previously said, after cancelling the Howard deal, that 

"We went into the election with a strong policy commitment [that] we would not export uranium to nation states who are not members of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty." 

Now, it seems that Smith is backflipping on the issue, saying that

"We have made this clear to Indian officials that we are bound by (Labor) party policy," Mr Smith said. "But if the 123 agreement is passed by the Indian parliament, we could consider joining a consensus." 

Which sounds very similar to the Howard government line at the time. 

There has obviously been a lot of pressure on the goverment to change its policy. The US and other nuclear suppliers want, and need, Australian support for the deal in the Nuclear Suppliers Group, and domestic uranium interests obviously want another market. 

The nuclear suppliers group is where push comes to shove, if the Rudd government was really serious about non-proliferation then they would not be allowing the sale of nuclear material to a state that is not part of the NPT. This was official labor policy at the national conference. But now Rudd looks like Australia will ok the deal at the NSG, and even go so far to export Australian uranium. This turnaround exposes the Labor oligarchy's real disregard for its members.

Clearly if the Labor government was serious about non-proliferation, it would block this deal, and use our position as one of the largest uranium miners to pursue the goal of non-proliferation, rather than short term profits.

The assignments are finished, the sickness is fading, so its time to get back to some (semi)substantial blogging. The NPT PrepCom which i mentioned a while ago wrapped up last week, and NGO reaching critial will has a great selection of documents and reports from the meeting.

The documents are relatively bland, and most of them mention the same unfulfilled treaties and the additional protocol, all look to Iran/North Korea as major threats to the regime, and call for more disarmament by the NWS. But a few significant issues did come up.

I'll start off with the Australian delegation, and the first thing that strikes you is the similarity with last years conference papers. A significant difference this year was that 2 NGO representatives made up part of the official Australian delegation. Definitely something to be proud of, and one of them was from MAPW. The interesting thing about this year was that they raised the idea of a nuclear weapons convention. The chair's factual summary also highlighted this. This is pretty new stuff, the idea of the NWC is an NGO idea floated around for a while. ICAN has a pretty detailed draft convention here. Its interesting stuff, and worth looking at and working towards. 

The final day of the conference saw the P5 finally come out with a joint statement, unlike in past years. Tensions between the states, and of course their virtual disregard for their NPT obligations, means the statement put the emphasis largely on non-nuclear weapons states compliance with the treaty. they also failed to mention the Comprehensive Test ban Treaty (CTBT) which is yet to be fully ratified by the US and China. The language is also differs significantly with other states, reflecting the P5s use of the treaty as an instrument of policy rather than something they themselves are actually bound by. Many states at the meeting expressed concern over the disarmament clause, and the seemingly opposite moves that some NWS are making in developing new nuclear weapon systems, and retaining nuclear weapons as a vital part of defence planning.

An interesting issue is that of nuclear weapons free zones (NWFZ) and in particular the middle east. The vast majority of states were quite ready to criticise Iran and North Korea, as they should, and make empty calls for the realisation of the 1995 resolution on a NWFZ in the Middle East. However, the elephant in the room was Israel. The only state in the middle east to have actually acquired nuclear weapons, and it was never actually named. The Iranian delegation let the cat out of the bag in this statement, 

"[the] Israeli clandestine nuclear program [is], the main obstacle to NWFZ in the region"
...
"Regrettably the trend of support and assistance of certain western countries to [the] Israeli nuclear weapon program has reached such a horrendous and indeed ridiculous state that the Israeli regime, a non-party to the NPT, whose nuclear arsenal coupled with its expansionst, repressive and state-terror policies and behavious is repeatedly recognised as the single most serious threat to regional and international peace and security, finds the audacity to cry wolf about [the] peaceful nuclear program of the NPT state parties. The agressive nature of that regime and the unequivocal support of the United States to it has let this regime belive that the law of the jungle rules the world.

Unfortunately, in the current session we witnessed that the attack of a non-party to the NPT on Syria a state Party to the treaty not only was not condemned by some western countries but also they turned their criticism to a non-nuclear weapon state who by joining the NPT has legally foregone [the] nuclear option. The position of this group of countries would send a wrong message that it is ok for some to have nuclear weapons and stay outside of the NPT, while others who are state parties to the treaty should be targeted"

Wow! I hope that shook things up a little. Even if it is left to Iran to say it, a state that has violated the NPT itself, its still pretty awesome to hear.  

A good collection of resources on last Septembers Israeli strike on Syria is available at FAS' secrecy blog here. Check out especially the sourcebook. FAS is pretty awesome. 

A pretty interesting document on the nuclear ties between Syria and North Korea, and the recent destruction of what is claimed to be a nuclear reactor in Syria, has turned up at ArmsControlWonk. 

Pretty amazing to get hold the full text of this sort of stuff. 

I feel like this blog is coming across a bit like a spokesman for the Iranian foreign minister, and I really dont want to do that, but alot of the stuff written here should be said.

NTI reported yesterday (US) that director of the CIA Mike Hayden has questioned last years NIE and has personally concluded that Iran does in fact have a weaponisation program.

"...when asked whether he personally believed Iran was developing nuclear weapons, he replied “Yes.”

"You know, this is not court of law stuff … in terms of beyond all reasonable doubt,” he said. “This is Mike Hayden looking at the body of evidence.”

But, as the report notes...

"He cited Iran’s behavior as suggestive of a nuclear weapon intention rather than any specific evidence."

Does that seem a little familiar? The report makes the point that suspicious behaviour as evidence was what led us to war with Iraq five years ago. But many other top US officials are making similar claims, and disputing the NIE, with little to no evidence. I dont claim that any NIE can be a flawless document, but the attacks do have the hint of political motivation. Dick Cheney has claimed Iran is intent on weapons grade enrichment, Bush has claimed that Iran is pushing for the bomb, and even the man who authored the report, National Intelligence Director Mike McConnel, has said he "...would change a few things."

Now, I havent seen what they've seen. But there does seem to be little real evidence pointing towards any Iranian weaponisation program. Two major documents on Iran's nuclear program, the latest IAEA report and the NIE, put forward litle confidence that Iran currently  has a weapons program, and at worst one existed until 2003. 

The weaponisation issue now is where any future Iranian bomb program is going to come from. Diversion of nuclear material under the guise of the civil program would be near impossible under the IAEA and the amount of attention Iran is recieving, so any program now must be an undeclared facility. This is where the focus should be

We also have to remember that Iran did break its safeguards agreement with the IAEA, and still refuses to stop its enrichment program after calls (and sanctions) from the UN to do so. 

However, this does not mean we should base policy on suspicions. Dubious suspicions have already led us to one bad conclusion, we cant let it lead us to another.